Evidential probability, objective bayesianism, non-monotonicity and system P

Abstract

This paper is a comparison of how first-order Kyburgian Evidential Probability (EP), second-order EP, and objective Bayesian epistemology compare as to the KLM system-P rules for consequence relations and the monotonic / non-monotonic divide.

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Jon Williamson
University of Manchester

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