Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (1) (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals’ Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein’s Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals’ Paradox arises.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,337

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

No Shadow of a Doubt.Michael Williams - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:179-208.
The Animal in Epistemology.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):97-119.
Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.
Common Knowledge and the Theory of Interaction.Ann Elizabeth Cudd - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements.Angélique Thébert - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):129-155.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-04-01

Downloads
75 (#279,793)

6 months
18 (#163,138)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Wilby
Anglia Ruskin University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.

View all 33 references / Add more references