Reflections on Inquiry and Truth arising from Peirce's Method for the Fixation of Belief

In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Peirce. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 87--126 (2004)
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Citations of this work

Fallibilism and the Aim of Inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):1 - 22.
Disjunctivism and the Ethics of Disbelief.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):139-163.
Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.
Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock & David W. Agler - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.

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