Inflation of Conflict

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 280–281 (2018-05-09)
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Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the inflation of conflict (IC). A form of IC is a type of hasty generalization. A wider view of how things stand outside the courtroom may reveal little real disagreement among experts. Conventions in the popular press that promote “both sides of the story” or constant debate formats seem to encourage this type of IC. Another form of IC correctly points to disagreement in a field but incorrectly implies that, as a result, little can be known. Noting disagreement among authorities can be the basis of a good argument. When there is widespread disagreement on the core aspects of a topic and the participants are bona fide authorities, then there is a good reason for a non‐expert to suspend judgment on the issue.

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