Abstract

The connection between ontology and explanation is evident from an inquiry into the limits of explanation. Conceived as such, chapters 1-3 of the dissertation center on what has been called the question of existence , and chapters 4-6 center on what I call the question of the world . ;The main thesis of chapters 1-3 is that the question of existence is meaningless. To justify this I argue that the logic of why-explanation is deductive subsumption under a generalization. Since why-explanations must involve a generalization, and since in explaining actual events and situations this generalization must have a factual basis, it follows that any such explanation must presuppose conditions more general than what is being explained. Consequently, to explain the totality of conditions would be in principle impossible. This view has been challenged by advocates of what is called total explanation. However, in chapters 2 and 3 total explanation is shown either to involve the hypostatization of reason in explanation as a being or a vicious circularity in explanation. ;The main thesis of chapters 4-6 is that the question of the world is meaningless. To justify this I argue that spiritual creation is impossible since, as a matter of principle, entities with fundamentally disparate ontologies could not causally interact. Furthermore, I argue that we do not even have a coherent concept of the world as a whole. A main conclusion of chapters 5 and 6 is that the world could not meaningfully be said either to exist or not to exist since it does not have the ontological status of an object. Rather, the notion of the world, which involves the concepts of space and time, is prior to that of existence. ;Inquiry into the questions of existence and the world is thus seen to disclose certain logical and ontological limits of explanation that in no way depend upon any theory or assumptions connected with logical positivism