Knowledge Is NOT Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason

Logos and Episteme 6 (2):237-243 (2015)
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Abstract

Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.

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Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel.Errol Lord - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):476-487.
Epistemic Worth.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.

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References found in this work

Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.

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