Too Many Animals, Too Many Thinkers

Abstract

Animalism, the thesis that each of us is a human animal, is a prominent materialist account of what we are. Animalism is often motivated by an attractive line of reasoning, the Thinking Animal Argument. And, independently, animalism has been challenged by appeals to a metaphysical puzzle, the problem of the many. In this paper, I draw attention to the relationship between the Thinking Animal Argument and the problem of the many. I further argue that in virtue of this relationship, animalists are left in an unfortunate position: animalists cannot hold onto their most successful argument without undermining animalism itself.

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Kristin Seemuth Whaley
Carroll University

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References found in this work

Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Brutal Composition.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 310-326.

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