The Rights and Wrongs of Rudeness

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1):1-22 (2006)
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Abstract

Rudeness is normally viewed as a moral failing, but there are times when it is excusable or even justified. In this article I propose a definition of the concept that helps us ascertain whether, why, and to what extent a rude action is blameworthy or excusable. I consider the most common sorts of circumstance in which rudeness is morally acceptable, and I argue that the perceived increase in rudeness is, in large part, a consequence of our living in a dynamic society where egalitarian attitudes challenge established hierarchies.

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Emrys Westacott
Alfred University

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