Inverted Intentionality

Faith and Philosophy 26 (3):233-252 (2009)
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Abstract

Continental philosophy of religion often takes place within the horizons of phenomenology. A central theme of this tradition is the correlation, in one form or another, of intentional act (noesis) and intentional object (noema), the “object” as given to or taken by the subject. But in dialectical tension with this theme is the notion of inverted intentionality in which the arrows of meaning bestowing intentionality come toward the self rather than emanating from the self. This theme is developed by Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, among others. Since each of these is in some fashion an atheist, it is surprising but important that their reflections on what it means to be seen or to be addressed keep turning toward the question of God. This suggests that the basic concept is important for the philosophy of religion, at least in monotheistic contexts.

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