Abstract

This article critically assesses a recent interpretation of Descartes’s physics, according to which he accepts a medieval account of the relation between God and physical creatures commonly called concurrentism. On this medieval view, God cooperates with creatures as efficient causes in bringing about change. If Descartes were to accept it, then it would entail that physical creatures (bodies) count as efficient causes in some way (otherwise God could not be said to cooperate with them), thus settling a long-standing debate about whether Cartesian bodies are efficient causes in body-body interaction. I argue on two independent bases that he does not accept this view. First, I argue that there are metaphysical difficulties with reconstructing Cartesian physics on the concurrentist view. Second, I argue that the textual evidence is not only insufficient to establish that Descartes is a concurrentist, but furthermore it supports an occasionalistic interpretation of body-body interaction instead.