Transcendental Philosophy and Mind-Body Reductionism

Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 16:390-392 (2008)
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Abstract

The notion of “representation” is central to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. But naturalism and mind-body reductionism tend to reduce talk of (first-person) representation to stories of (third-person) causality and evolution. How does Kant fare in this context?

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Christian Wenzel
National Taiwan University

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