Abstract

Whereas caring is commonly perceived as a moral virtue or a socially beneficial ethical practice, resentment appears to represent its opposite. Advocates of care ethics have vehemently criticized the abstract and aloof nature of traditional ethical theories and argue that care ethics offers a perspective from which we may appreciate interpersonal sensitivity and responsiveness to individuals, per se. Following in the philosophical tradition of Nietzsche and Scheler, resentment—taken as the emotional state of lingering animosity towards individuals, combined with the inclination to withhold assistance and abstain from caring—is often identified as an unjustified and unethical disposition. The paper aims to challenge this perspective and support the moral and historical validity of resentment in specific situations. It thereby recalls a social historical dimension to the often merely physiologically and individually dominated discourse about aging. Drawing on Jean Améry’s seminal account, I suggest viewing resentment as an attitude that asserts the authority to reevaluate the historical situation and to challenge the primacy of immediate needs (the here-and-now of a person in need of care). From this perspective, resentment too displays sensitivity to individuals and their life stories, yet it invokes a sense of justice that exceeds the temporal framework of caring if restrained to bodily and physiological needs. To illustrate this argument, this paper recounts an incident in a nursing home in postwar Germany, in 1986.