The "Socratic" Paradoxes in Plato's "Hippias Minor" and "Protagoras"

Dissertation, Columbia University (1982)
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Abstract

Socrates has been criticized since the time of Aristotle for having held certain paradoxical ethical doctrines including "Virtue is knowledge," "No one does wrong willingly," and "All the virtues are one," which are thought plainly to contradict human experience. Yet the very notion of "Socratic" paradoxes belies the Socratic profession of ignorance so prominent in precisely those dialogues in which the paradoxes are central. ;The Socratic portrait painted by Plato includes both the Socratic profession of ignorance and its complement, i.e. Socrates' habit of questioning supposed "wise men" regarding their areas of expertise to see if they were really wise and, ostensibly, to be himself enlightened by them. One prime target for Socrates' questioning was the sophists, itinerant teachers of various subjects, including rhetoric and eristic. The Hippias Minor and Protagoras, two of Plato's early, aporetic dialogues, recount the fictional confrontations between Socrates and the sophist Hippias and between Socrates and the sophist Protagoras . ;Both these dialogues contain one or more famous Socratic doctrines plus apparently "immoral" views: The Hippias Minor contains the view that the true man and the false man are the same and that the good man does wrong willingly; the Protagoras contains the view that pleasure is the good. ;Careful analysis of these dialogues reveals that both the "immoral" doctrines and the allegedly Socratic paradoxes they contain are actually views held by the sophistic protagonists of these dialogues or views implied by their views. In particular, the sophistic claim to teach virtue implies "Virtue is knowledge." ;If it is indeed the case that the views expressed in these dialogues are sophistic, then the Platonic portrayal of Socrates as questioner stands firm, Socrates is cleared of the criticisms levelled at him because of his paradoxical views, and the sophists become the proper objects of these criticisms

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Roslyn Weiss
Lehigh University

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