Abstract

I take a close look at the Cartesian notion of material falsity. I concern myself with two main issues: the sort of representational breakdown which makes an idea materially false, and the role played by the account of material falsity in the argument of the Meditations. ;The Meditations is a dynamic work in which the meditator gradually comes to attain a better understanding of his own nature, the nature of God and of the physical world. I argue that recognising the dynamic nature of the Meditations helps throw light on the two issues I am concerned with. ;Firstly, by recognising the Meditations as a dynamic work, one can understand how the criteria by which an idea is determined as materially false might vary according to the state of knowledge attained by the meditator. I argue that understanding the constraints the meditator faces in the Third Meditation would help explain why he has to adopt at that point a 'narrow' account of a materially false idea as one which 'represents non-things as things'. Again, tracking how the meditator later breaks free of these constraints would explain why he can eventually widen the notion of a materially false idea to include any idea which 'provides material for 'false judgements". Thus, apparent inconsistencies in Descartes' account of material falsity are ironed out on a dynamic perspective of the Meditations. ;Secondly, having a dynamic view of the Meditations involves that one attend to how the meditator builds his later findings upon earlier ones. This will will reveal that the meditator has good reasons for introducing the notion of material falsity at the point that he does. I argue that the Third Meditation passage on material falsity is important because it introduces a certain account about the nature of deficiency. This account of deficiency turns out to be a crucial building block for the subsequent Third Meditation proofs of God's existence, and it also casts light on the Fourth Meditation account of error