Sartre’s transcendental phenomenology

In Dan Zahavi, Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications is marked by an apparent ambivalence towards Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favour of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

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Jonathan Webber
Cardiff University

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Sartre, Kant, and the spontaneity of mind.Dimitris Apostolopoulos - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):413-431.

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