Abstract

This dissertation examines how the distinction between what is said and what is implicated should be applied to metaphorical language. I claim that metaphor has been incorrectly held to belong to the domain of pragmatics---what is implicated by an utterance---and I argue that metaphorical interpretations can and should be regarded as constituting what is said. ;The first two chapters develop the case against two implicature accounts of metaphor: Grice's account of metaphor as conversational implicature, and the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor as 'loose talk' developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. Two reasons to dispute these characterizations of metaphor as implicature are developed by examining dissimilarities between alleged metaphorical implicatures and more typical cases of implicature. The third chapter focuses on the notion of what is said in cases of literal language, and explores where and how the line between what is said and what is implicated should be drawn for several controversial cases. I argue for a view of such cases according to which considerable contextual variation is taken to fall within the realm of what is said. With this view of what is said in place, the final two chapters of the dissertation explore how a semantic account of metaphor might go. Two existing semantic accounts are examined, and difficulties with each are discussed. Finally, a characterization of metaphorical content is proposed, and an alternative semantic account is developed