Abstract

The traditional understanding of Pyrrhonism claims that the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on all claims. This is because the arguments the Pyrrhonist uses seems to undermine the possibility of justified belief. The most famous of these arguments for the impossibility of justified belief is ‘Agrippa’s trilemma.’ This argument says that any attempt to give reasons for a claim will end in assertion, circularity, or infinite regress. However, infinite regress, arbitrary assertion, or circular reasoning cannot justify a claim, so no claim can ever be justified. I want to suggest that there is a different skeptical challenge that arises from the trilemma other than the traditional one. This challenge comes out of consideration of the significance of disagreement in Sextus Empricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. This new challenge says that because reasoning must end in regress, assertion, or circularity, you get rationally irresolvable disagreement. The idea is you can have two complete chains of reasons that support inconsistent claims. This is possible because one chain might bottom out in one assertion and the other chain in a different assertion; or one uses assertion, the other circularity; and so on. This results in two inconsistent claims, each following from the reasons given. If both claims follow from the reasons cited, then we have equal reason to think each of the claims is true. The Pyrrhonist thinks that when you have equal reason for two incompatible claim you ought to suspend judgment. Thus, you get a skeptical challenge from Agrippa’s trilemma, but one that is not as radical as the traditional understanding.