The Fourfold Root of Philosophical Skepticism

Sorites 14 (1):85-109 (2002)
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Abstract

Knowledge may be defined in terms of four necessary conditions: belief, justification, truth and gettier. I argue that a form of philosophical skepticism may be raised with respect to each.

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Mark Walker
New Mexico State University

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Prolegomena to any future philosophy.M. Walker - 2002 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 10 (1):1541-0099.

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