Chapter 5 Skeptical-Dogmatism and the Self-Undermining Objection

In Outlines of skeptical-dogmatism: on disbelieving our philosophical views. Lanham: Lexington Books (2024)
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Abstract

This chapter puts to rest for all of eternity the self-undermining charge against conciliationism.

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Mark Walker
New Mexico State University

Citations of this work

Six Roles for Inclination.Zach Barnett - 2024 - Mind 133 (532):972-1000.
Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default.Mark Satta - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-25.

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