Abstract

The dissertation questions whether Plato's forms are "separate" in the damaging sense explained by Aristotle and attempts to articulate an interpretation of forms according to which forms are not "separate" in any traditional sense of this term. Aristotle's report and critique of Plato's theory of forms are analyzed. A discrepancy is found between Plato's Heraclitean motivations for some kind of "separation " and the type of separation Aristotle says Plato settled upon. The work of Annas, Owen, Vlastos, Brentlinger and Patterson is consulted on the question of separation. The scholarly accounts ignore crucial evidence from Republic IV and give inadequate explanation how Plato's theory of knowledge could countenance and use separate forms without contradiction. An alternative interpretation of forms is proposed. The crucial epistemological passages of Republic V , VI and VII are scrutinized and support is found for the proposed interpretation of forms. The separation countenanced by the proposed interpretation is compared to the debate over "separation" between Gail Fine and Donald Morrison. Brief consideration is given to the Presocratic precedents of the sense assigned to "separation " by the proposed interpretation