Abstract

In recent years, different proposals articulate specific rights for the regulation of neurotechnology, also known as "neurorights". A central concern regarding neurotechnological applications is that of mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing them. After proposing a detailed conceptualization of mental privacy, I will argue that the protection of this right is relevant because it is at the basis of two fundamental ethical and legal dimensions of persons, identity and autonomy. I claim that mental privacy is presupposed by the relational conception of identity, and that this connection allows us to identify some limitations of current data privacy regulations. I then argue that relational identity is presupposed by the notion of autonomy, and this connection highlights relational dimensions of this concept that are not adequately articulated in current relational theories of autonomous action. This implies that the protection of mental privacy is also necessary for the protection if this second ethical and legal dimension of persons.