Abstract

The separation-of-powers literature has entertained the possibility of differentiating governmental functions at a conceptual, pre-institutional level, as a way of defining the separation of powers. However, it can be objected that attempts at differentiating functions at this level cannot escape a problem of arbitrariness. In this article, I develop an account of the separation of powers which addresses this problem. On my account, the legislative function is defined by the creation of validity claims, understood as claims making it a matter of normative common-knowledge that such and such normative attitudes hold for the interaction between agents. The executive-judicial function is defined by the specification of rights and other jural positions out of the validity claims. This account of the separation of powers has the double advantage that it works at a conceptual, pre-institutional level, and that it is able to distinguish between the functions in a non-arbitrary manner. In developing this account, I also consider its practical implications. I argue that the conceptual distinction between the legislative and the executive-judicial functions is expressive of rule-of-law values, and that this might render it a sufficient but not necessary condition for the institutional separation of powers.