Structural Realism and Causation: An Unhappy Marriage?

Abstract

It has recently been objected that structural realism, in its various guises, is unable to adequately account for causal phenomena (see, for example, Psillos 2006). In this talk, I consider whether structural realism has the resources to address this objection

Other Versions

unknown Votsis, Ioannis (unknown) "Structural Realism: From an Epistemological Point of View".

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,458

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Recent Debates Over Structural Realism.Daniel McArthur - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):209-224.
Causation and Structural Realism.Martin Schmidt - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (4):508-521.
Causal Informational Structural Realism.Majid D. Beni - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):117-134.
Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):17 - 31.
Structural realism beyond physics.Dana Tulodziecki - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:106--114.
Reconsidering Structural Realism.Dan McArthur - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):517 - 536.
Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature.Bruno Borge - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3):447-468.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-06-20

Downloads
111 (#192,895)

6 months
10 (#411,161)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ioannis Votsis
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Add more references