Why the argument from causal closure against the existence of immaterial things is bad

In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang (2006)
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Abstract

Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.

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Daniel von Wachter
International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein