How to Reconcile Seeing-As with Seeing-In (with Mimetic Purposes in Mind)

In Gregory Currie, Petr Kot̓átko & Martin Pokorny, Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications. pp. 99-113 (2012)
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Abstract

I will try to show that seeing-as doubly grounds seeing-in. First, I will urge that a seeing-as of a certain kind, what I will call illusory seeing-as, partially constitutes the twofold experience of seeing-in, by being what the proper ‘seeing-in’- fold of that experience really amounts to: the experience of illusorily yet awarely seeing the picture’s image as the picture’s subject, in other terms, an experience of aware misrecognition of that image as that subject. Secondly, I will argue that such an illusory seeing-as rests upon a seeing-as of another kind, what I will call organizational seeing-as. This latter seeing-as consists in grasping certain grouping properties of the picture’s image while facing that image, i.e., the properties of the image’s elements to be grouped, or organized, in a certain way, i.e., under a certain orientation. I will indeed claim that entertaining a seeing-as of the latter form explains why one recognizes, although (knowingly) incorrectly, the picture’s image as a certain subject. For such a seeing-as consists in grasping roughly the same properties one would grasp when facing that subject. From this, a further interesting result follows: objective resemblance, or mimesis, in grouping properties between the picture and its subject is a necessary condition of pictoriality, of what makes a representation a pictorial representation, hence ultimately is a necessary condition of depiction.

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Why, as responsible for figurativity, seeing-in can only be inflected seeing-in.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.

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