Abstract

What role does the overlap between civilian and military activities in the life sciences play in thwarting arms control over biological weapons? States have used international institutions to control many dual-use capabilities, from nuclear reactors to aircraft and rockets. But efforts to manage the military uses of biotechnology in this manner— including with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—have consis- tently fallen short. Recent research from Jane Vaynman and me reveals why this is the case. We specify how variation in the two dimensions of dual-use nature of technology can enable or block arms control agreements. This essay first summarizes the results from our research, focusing on how the dual-use dilemma has varied across all weapons technologies available to states over the past 150 years. The second part focuses on why it is so difficult to curtail biological weapons with international institutions. Biotechnology falls in a “dead zone” for arms control, where daunting detection and security risks kill the prospects for verifiable cooperation. The conclusion draws lessons for disincentivizing the development of bio- weapons from alternative arms control efforts over other technologies in the dead zone, notably taking smaller slices and establishing behavioral norms.