Belief and Truth a Skeptic Reading of Plato: A Skeptic Reading of Plato

Oxford University Press USA (2015)
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Abstract

In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists.

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Katja Vogt
Columbia University

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