Abstract

An effective demonstration that the techniques of Oxford analysis can be put to constructive as well as to critical philosophic use. Mr. Geach considers a number of connected topics--among them the nature and formation of concepts, judgment, and sensation--advancing positive theses while rejecting views he holds to be false. He is particularly opposed to the "abstractionist" doctrine of concept formation. Concepts, he holds, are not capacities for recognizing recurrent features in experience, but "mental abilities, exercised in acts of judgment, and expressed in the intelligent use of words," though not, he adds, "exclusively in such use." Despite the connections among the topics dealt with, the book remains somewhat episodic, and many of its points are sketched or suggested only, rather than fully developed. But Mr. Geach's arguments are elegant, and what is worked out is compelling. One curious feature of the book is its frequent citation of St. Thomas Aquinas--Mr. Geach seems as anxious to be on the side of the Angelic Doctor as he is to be in tune with Wittgenstein.--V. C. C.