Four valued semantics and the liar

Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212 (1984)
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10.1007/bf00453021

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Citations of this work

HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic.Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):305-405.
Partiality and its dual.J. Michael Dunn - 2000 - Studia Logica 66 (1):5-40.
There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and Neither.Jc Beall - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):Article no. 1.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.

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