True lies and attempted lies

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Sometimes speakers try to lie and inadvertently assert something true. Subjectivists about lying hold that such speakers are lying despite telling the truth. Objectivists hold that such speakers are not lying: they try to lie but fail. The first aim of this paper is to point to novel cases supporting subjectivism that do not involve speakers inadvertently asserting something true. Its second aim is to use these and other cases to explore the distinction between lying and trying to lie. Which factors can thwart an attempt at lying? In which situations do we judge that a speaker has tried to lie but failed? Attending to these questions not only offers insights into the act of lying, but also helps to scrutinise the objectivist strategy of explaining away intuitions about apparent cases of lying while telling the truth.

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Author's Profile

Emanuel Viebahn
Universität Hamburg

Citations of this work

The size of a lie: from truthlikeness to sincerity.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.
The intent to deceive.Roderick M. Chisholm & Thomas D. Feehan - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):143-159.
Lying: Knowledge or belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.

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