The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations

Journal of Modern Philosophy 5 (1):2 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper offers a fresh interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of relations. I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s idea of non-ideal relations inhering in one subject. Such single-inhering relations should not be understood in terms of non-relational, absolute properties, but in terms of perspectival relations. Through the notion of perspective, we can understand how a relation between two relata inheres in only one of those relata. For example, my perception of you involves my point of view. Therefore, it is individual to me. My perception of you is not equal to your perception of me. However, it does relate me to you. Perspective can thus explain how relations only inhere in one subject while nevertheless really relating one thing to another. This leads to a novel understanding of the rejection of purely extrinsic denominations and the supposed isolation of substances. Published on 2023-03-22 10:43:18.

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References found in this work

Monadology.Montgomery Furth - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (2):169-200.
Disentangling Leibniz's views on relations and extrinsic denominations.Anja Jauernig - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2):pp. 171-205.
Leibniz’s Body Realism.Peter Loptson - 2006 - The Leibniz Review 16:1-42.
A Closer Look At Leibniz’s Alleged Reduction of Relations.Mark A. Kulstad - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):417-432.

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