Rip Van Winkle and the Retention of 'Today'-Belief: A Puzzle

Res Philosophica 97 (3):459-469 (2020)
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Abstract

Can a subject who expresses a belief with ‘today’ on a given day, and subsequently loses track of time, retain and re-express that belief on a future, potentially distant day? Since Kaplan’s tentative remarks on Rip Van Winkle, it has become popular to answer this question in the positive. However, a remarkably simple variation of the Rip Van Winkle story can show that this kind of view leads to a puzzling dilemma: either subjects cannot re-express a belief with utterances of ‘today’ on the same day, or else they may rationally exhibit conflicting stances toward the same ‘today’-belief. This result may be seen as supporting the claim that retention of ‘today’-belief over time requires the tracking of days. Yet it may also spur further research into the capacities involved in belief retention and re-expression to solve the puzzle.

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Author's Profile

Víctor M. Verdejo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Citations of this work

Dynamic disagreement.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (8):1116-1141.

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A Problem About Continued Belief.John Perry - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):317-332.
Shared modes of presentation.Simon Prosser - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (4):465-482.
The Publicity of Thought.Andrea Onofri - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272).
Mental Files: an Introduction.Michael Murez & François Recanati - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):265-281.

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