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Illness, suffering and voluntary euthanasia
Bioethics 21 (2):75–83 (2007)
Abstract
It is often accepted that we may legitimately speak about voluntary euthanasia only in cases of persons who are suffering because they are incurably injured or have an incurable disease. This article argues that when we consider the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia, we have no good reason to concentrate only on persons who are ill or injured and suffering.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Medical expertise, existential suffering and ending life.Jukka Varelius - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2):104-107.
Problems in Pleasants' Wittgensteinian Idea of Basic Moral Certainties.Jordi Fairhurst - 2019 - Ethical Perspectives 26 (2):271-298.
Everyday Attitudes About Euthanasia and the Slippery Slope Argument.Adam Feltz - 2015 - In Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi, New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 145-165.
Assisted Dying and the Proper Role of Patient Autonomy.Emma C. Bullock - 2015 - In Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi, New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 1-16.
‘Existential suffering’ and voluntary medically assisted dying.Robert Young - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2):108-109.
References found in this work
The myth of mental illness.Thomas S. Szasz - 2004 - In Arthur L. Caplan, James J. McCartney & Dominic A. Sisti, Health, Disease, and Illness: Concepts in Medicine. Georgetown University Press. pp. 43--50.
On euthanasia: Blindspots in the argument from mercy.Sarah Bachelard - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):131–140.
Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'.Derek Bolton - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.
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