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What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):528-529 (2007)
Abstract
If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is comparedAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep.Melanie Rosen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (17):4107-4142.
Phenomenal and Access Consciousness Ned Block and Cynthia MacDonald: Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289 - 317.
The dorsal stream and the visual horizon.Michael Madary - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):423-438.
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