The limited belief in chance

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (3):499-513 (1991)
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Abstract

In a rarely quoted paper, published in 1958 in the American Journal of Physics, T. Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa introduced the idea that the concept of chance as employed in physics is subject to what she called a ‘Limited Belief in Chance’. In this paper I elaborate the latter concept and the distinction between absolute chance and relative randomness, where the latter, but not the former, is governed by the theory of probability. I argue that in the twentieth century virtually nobody believes seriously in the possiblity of absolute chance, whereas the concept of chance in the Scientific World Picture is only ‘chancy’ relative to a limited belief in chance grounded in the Manifest World Picture of an orderly world.

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Philosophy of science in the netherlands.James W. McAllister - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2):191 – 204.

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References found in this work

Chaos, prediction and laplacean determinism.M. A. Stone - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (2):123--31.
Is Our Universe a Mere Fluke? The Cosmological Argument and Spinning the Universes.Jaap Van Brakel - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:75-82.

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