Suffering and the goals of medicine

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1 (2):125-131 (1998)
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Abstract

Taking as its starting point a recent statement of the Goals of Medicine published by the Hastings Centre, this paper argues against the dualistic distinction between pain and suffering. It uses an Aristotelian conception of the person to suggest that malady, pain, and disablement are objective forms of suffering not dependent upon any state of consciousness of the victim. As a result, medicine effectively relieves suffering when it cures malady and relieves pain. There is no medical mission to confront the spiritual condition of the patient

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Citations of this work

Conceptualizing suffering and pain.Noelia Bueno-Gómez - 2017 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 12:7.
What we talk about when we talk about pediatric suffering.Tyler Tate - 2020 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 41 (4):143-163.
Three concepts of suffering.Steven D. Edwards - 2003 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 6 (1):59-66.

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