Response to William Lane Craig’s God over All

Philosophia Christi 21 (2):267-275 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In contrast to William Lane Craig’s view this article presents a sort of precis of my position on ontological commitment—whether you call it neo-Quineanism or not—and its implications for the nominalism-realism debate, a precis that proceeds from first principles.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,060

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Craig’s God Cannot Create a Temporal Universe.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2021 - Philosophia Christi 23 (2):329-340.
“Uncaused Beginnings” Revisited.Graham Oppy - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (2):205-210.
Do Divine Conceptualist Accounts Fail?Greg Welty - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):255-266.
Craig, Anti-Platonism, and Objective Morality.R. Scott Smith - 2017 - Philosophia Christi 19 (2):331-343.
Craig's Contradictory Christ.Dale Tuggy - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 7 (2).

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-04-02

Downloads
154 (#148,519)

6 months
18 (#160,076)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references