L'analogie et la vérité chez Franz Brentano

Philosophiques 26 (2):203-217 (1999)
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Abstract

Aristotelian ideas on analogy that may be found in Brentano's early thesis help to elucidate his theory of truth, especially what Brentano wrote on truth at the end of his life. It seems as though Brentano did not distinguish between the notion of truth and the notion of evidence ; but, in fact, he has two notions of truth. The original sense of truth in a true judgment means evidence ; in a derived or analogical sense, a blind judgment, which corresponds to an evident judgment in all other aspects, is also called true. Such a judgment is true in so far as it may be judged with evidence.

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