La connivence ontologique. Approches de la rationalité intramondaine dans le 'Discours de métaphysique' de Leibniz

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 56 (3):494 (1994)
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Abstract

In his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz appears to have been thinking of a real andanti-predicative logic which would coincide with the world's inner logos. An analysis of Leibniz's teleology exposes the relevance of an intramundane rationality, establishing an epistemology of ontological connivance between the knowing subject and his world. At the same time, this philosophy, proposed by Leibniz at the very heart of modernity, shows itself as a philosophy of the universe of life, thanks to an Aristotelian understanding of force and a qualitative interpretation of individuality. The present review of the Discourse on Metaphysics draws on phenomenological inspiration as well as particular interest in the interpretations of Leibnizian thought by Herder and Goethe

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