How Husserl’s and Searle’s Contextual Model Reformulates the Discussion About the Conceptual Content of Perception

In Roberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi & Roberto Rubio (eds.), Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Cham: Springer. pp. 57-76 (2017)
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Abstract

I argue that Husserl’s notion of horizon and Searle’s notion of background offer a contextual model of perception that significantly reformulates the debate about the conceptual vs. nonconceptual content of perception. I illustrate the model by using a test case: the perception of an ancient Roman milestone—an example given by Husserl—which both Husserl and Searle consider to be a direct and immediate perception without inferences involved. I further differentiate Husserl’s and Searle’s views, arguing that Husserl’s model has the advantage of accounting for the diachronic aspect of perception.

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Pol Vandevelde
Marquette University

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