Game strategies, promises, and rational choice

Abstract

We will study game trees as representations of rational choice and as representations of player preferences, and promises as public announcements of genuine intentions. Promises in a game change what players know about the preferences of other players. They can be modelled as operations that change a given game into a different game where players know more about the effects of their strategies.

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2009-01-28

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Jan Van Eijck
University of Amsterdam

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