Abstract

This dissertation examines the relations between a Humean conception of reasons for action and desire, and ethical relativism. I argue that the former supports the latter by providing support for the idea that similarly situated people can have reasons to act differently. I then go on to examine the adequacy of the Humean account of rationality. In doing that, I assess an argument that this theory is most acceptable because if fits best with the Humean theory of motivation, a theory we have independent reason to accept. I argue that we do not have such independent reason, and that the Humean theory of rationality will have to be assessed on its merits. I then go on to argue that we have reason to modify the Humean theory of reasons, at least to accept a kind of reasoning I call analogical reasoning about ends. As a result, the Humean theory of motivation must be abandoned. ;I then examine the ramifications of accepting the modified account of rationality for the issue of ethical relativism. I conclude that relativism is still viable. In fact, if the Humean theory of reasons is modified only to accommodate analogical reasoning about ends, then relativism is to be preferred over non-relativist accounts of ethics. But, given that the Humean theory of rationality is false, it no longer should be seen as a constraint on acceptable accounts of rationality. Thus, further modifications to the theory of rationality might be in the offing, and some of those could be incompatible with relativism.