Supposition and Blindness

Mind 125 (499):895-901 (2016)
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Abstract

In ‘Reasoning and Regress’ I argued that inferring a conclusion from a set of propositions may simply consist in taking it that the conclusion follows from these propositions—thereby defusing familiar regress arguments. Sinan Dogramaci challenges the generality of this view, on the grounds that sometimes you may draw conclusions from no premisses that you believe. I respond by clarifying a distinction between the premisses of an argument from the reasons your conclusion is based upon. While suppositional reasoning may involve no premisses in the former sense, it does not follow that it does not involve concluding something on the basis of reasons. This allows the view defended in ‘Reasoning and Regress’ to extend to suppositional reasoning.

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Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales

References found in this work

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality.Mark Jago - 2014 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.

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