Abstract

The aim of this dissertation, "Studies in the Moral Philosophy of David Hume," is to offer solutions to four central problems regarding the moral philosophy of David Hume. These problems have been the objects of contemporary philosophical discussions. The four central questions of interest in this dissertation are the following: what is Hume's argument against moral rationalism?; what role do the concepts of sympathy and the general point of view play in Hume's moral philosophy?; what is Hume's argument against the sensible knave?; and finally, what is Hume's view of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the comparison between secondary and moral qualities? In discussing these four questions, I find that an important picture of Hume that emerges is one of a category buster who does not fit neatly into the categories in which his commentators seek to place him. In this dissertation, I present some of the best and brightest attempts to solve these problems, and show why I do not think they quite get Hume right. I go on to offer solutions to the problems