Personal autonomy and informed consent

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (1):17-24 (2009)
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Abstract

Two ways of understanding the notion of autonomy are outlined and discussed in this article, in order to clarify how and if informed consent requirements in biotechnological research are to be justified by the promotion of personal autonomy: A proceduralist conception linking autonomy with authenticity, and a substantivist conception linking autonomy with control. The importance of distinguishing autonomy from liberty is emphasised, which opens for a possible conflict between respecting the freedom and the autonomy of research participants. It is argued that this has implications for how consent requirements based on different criteria of specificity and understanding should be viewed and justified

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - Philosophy 64 (250):571-572.

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