Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59 (2017)
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Abstract

A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for in terms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content can be fully accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. This paper presents an argument against this view. The core idea is that the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states are not fixed entirely by what these states represent (their representational contents), but depend in part on how they represent (their representational attitudes or modes). The argument highlights the myriad liabilities and difficulties one must accrue when one tries to appeal only to what phenomenally conscious states represent in accounting for their phenomenal individuation.

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

The Three Circles of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero, Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford University Press. pp. 169-191.
Many-to-One Intentionalism.Manolo Martínez & Bence Nanay - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (2):89-107.
Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Imperative Transparency.Manolo Martínez - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):585-601.
Fear beyond danger.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (5):647-663.

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References found in this work

Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1983 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry.
The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter, The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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