Aiming at truth

New York: Palgrave-Macmillan (2007)
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Abstract

The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended

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Nick Unwin
Lancaster University

Citations of this work

A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part A.Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):26-84.
Deflationist Truth is Substantial.Nicholas Unwin - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):257-266.
Belief and pluralistic ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven Romero - 2020 - Filosofia Unisinos 21 (3):260-267.
Books received. [REVIEW]Ralf Busse - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):455-466.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].

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