The Duplicity of Online Behavior

In Berrin A. Beasley & Mitchell R. Haney, Social Media and Living Well. Lexington Books. pp. 31-43 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

People commonly believe that any form of deception, no matter how innocuous it is and no matter whether the deceiving person intended it otherwise, is always morally wrong. In this paper, I will argue that deceiving in real-time is morally distinguishable from deceiving on-line because online actions aren’t as fine-grained as actions occurring in real-time. Our failure to detect the fine-grained characteristics of another avatar leads us to believe that that avatar intended to do a moral harm. Openly deceiving someone on Facebook or Twitter is not a way to build wholesome virtual friendships but to destroy them. This paper will show how the traditional understanding of the doing / allowing distinction fails to apply in cyberspace.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Self-deception.Frederick A. Siegler - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):29-43.
Hypocrisy and self‐deception.Daniel Statman - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):57-75.
A Definition of Deceiving.James Edwin Mahon - 2007 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):181-194.
Wer täuscht wen?Daniel Strassberg - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2016 (1):83-100.
My avatar, my self: Virtual harm and attachment.Jessica Wolfendale - 2007 - Ethics and Information Technology 9 (2):111-119.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-06

Downloads
414 (#72,850)

6 months
76 (#82,352)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Ulatowski
University of Waikato

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations