Marcin Tkaczyk’s Ockhamism, or Whether the Theory of Contingentia Praeterita is the only Plausible Solution to the Problem of FuturaContingentia

Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (4):115-134 (2018)
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Abstract

In the first part of this article, we point out and discuss these the contained in Marcin Tkaczyk’s book, Futura Contingentia, with which we agree completely or at least partially. In the second part of the paper, we seek to consider whether the solution of the futura contingentia problem, rooted in the basic intuitions of William of Ockham, is the only one possible and available for us. We argue that there is another possible approach to the problem of how to reconcile divine omniscience with contingent events rather than the Ockhamist solution. The alternative view, which we suggest, is “eternalism”, meaning that God is timeless, and that temporal necessity is compatible with contingent events and free decisions.

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