How Not to Square the Left Vienna Circle’s Non-Cognitivism with its Political Commitment

Perspectives on Science 32 (6):795-812 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper contextualizes and criticizes a recent attempt to square the socio-political commitment of the members of the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle with the ethical non-cognitivism that follows from their conception of cognitive meaningfulness. It is shown that intolerable consequences result from the moral-political reading of the “scientific world-conception” proposed and it is argued that squaring their commitment and non-cognitivism does not require such a reading. It is also pointed out how deleterious consequences are avoided by an already existent reconstruction of the left wing’s position which was misunderstood by the author criticized and which is briefly recollected.

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Thomas Uebel
University of Manchester

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References found in this work

Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.
Epistemic values and the argument from inductive risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Verificationism and (Some of) its Discontents.Thomas Uebel - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (4):1-31.
The Vienna Circle’s “Scientific World-Conception”: Philosophy of Science in the Political Arena.Donata Romizi - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):205-242.

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